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Abstract
Preference logics and AI preference representation languages
are both concerned with reasoning about preferences on com-
binatorial domains, yet so far these two streams of research
have had little interaction. This paper contributes to the bridg-
ing of these areas. We start by constructing a “prototypical”
preference logic, which combines features of existing prefer-
ence logics, and then we show that many well-known prefer-
ence languages, such as CP-nets and its extensions, are natu-
ral fragments of it. After establishing useful characterizations
of dominance and consistency in our logic, we study the com-
plexity of satisfiability in the general case as well as for mean-
ingful fragments, and we study the expressive power as well
as the relative succinctness of some of these fragments.
1. Introduction
Reasoning about preferences on combinatorial domains is
an important problem which has been addressed by at least
two different streams of work: preference logics, mainly
studied by philosophers, and preference representation lan-
guages, mainly studied by researchers in Artificial Intelli-
gence. These two areas have had little interaction so far,
partly because they have been studied by two distinct re-
search communities, and also because they focus on dif-
ferent issues: axiomatization and philosophical issues for
preference logics; elicitation, compact representation and
computational issues for AI1. Still, both communities have
common interests: they both aim at designing complex lan-
guages for expressing, and reasoning about, preferences on
complex domains; moreover, some key notions appear in
both communities, such as the ceteris paribus principle for
interpreting preference statements.
Bridging these two communities can bring benefits to
both. Preference logics can “import” from preference lan-
guages some computational results and techniques (such as
the complexity of reasoning tasks, or algorithms for opti-
mization), whereas preference languages can gain formal
logical foundations and added expressivity. Moreover, as we
Copyright c© 2010, Association for the Advancement of Artificial
Intelligence (www.aaai.org). All rights reserved.
1We do not mean that compact preference representation lan-
guages studied in AI are not based on logic; actually, quite a num-
ber of them are (see e.g. (Brewka 2004; Coste-Marquis et al.
2004)); but still, there, the focus is laid on computational issues.
show in the paper, some well-known preference languages
are fragments of some well-known preference logics.
This paper partly contributes to establishing such a bridge.
We start by giving some brief background on preference log-
ics and on AI preference languages. Then we define a proto-
typical preference logic, obtained by combining ideas from
the classical preference logic of von Wright (1963) and from
the modal preference logic recently studied in (van Ben-
them, Girard, and Roy 2009). The basic constructs of the
logic are preference statements between propositional for-
mulas, together with a set of formulas that must take identi-
cal values when the statement is interpreted. The language
is composed of boolean combinations of such preference
statements. The semantics is defined in terms of preference
relations on worlds (or outcomes, see further). We show
that the conjunctive fragment of the language enjoys specific
properties, such as the existence of a smallest preference
relation satisfying a conjunction of preference statements.
We also show how several well-known AI preference lan-
guages, such as CP-nets, TCP-nets, CP-theories, CI-nets or
prioritized goals, can be recovered as particular fragments
of the logic. We next provide a number of complexity re-
sults for our logic and some of its fragments, as well as for
the logics of von Wright and van Benthem et al. (van Ben-
them, Girard, and Roy 2009). Finally, we give some expres-
siveness and succinctness results for different fragments of
our logic. Please note that proofs have been omitted or ab-
breviated for lack of space. Missing proofs can be found
in a long version available at http://www.informatik.uni-
bremen.de/∼meghyn/pl-long.pdf.
2. Background
Throughout the paper, we consider a propositional language
built from a finite set of propositional symbols PS. Under
this assumption, we can identify propositional valuations
(or worlds) with maximal consistent conjunctions of liter-
als. For instance, if PS = {a,b}, the valuation where a is as-
signed true and b is assigned false is identified with the for-
mula a∧¬b. Such maximal consistent conjunctions of liter-
als will be called outcomes (a.k.a. alternatives). We freely
use this correspondence between worlds and outcomes in
notations, e.g., Mod(ϕ) will denote the set of outcomes that
imply ϕ (corresponding to the set of worlds that satisfy ϕ).
Preference Logics
A preference logic consists of a semantics and/or a for-
mal system meant to interpret dyadic preferences between
propositional formulas, or monadic, “absolute” preferences.
The starting point of preference logics is that individuals of-
ten express relative or absolute preferences that refer not to
isolated outcomes, but to logical formulas representing sets
of outcomes, which are generally not singletons, nor even
disjoints subsets. Indeed, interpreting the statement “ϕ is
preferred to ψ” is unproblematic when ϕ and ψ are complete
formulas (corresponding each to a unique outcome): such a
statement corresponds directly to its semantical counterpart
ω  ω′, where Mod(ϕ) = {ω} and Mod(ψ) = {ω′}. In a
similar way, a statement of indifference between ϕ and ψ
corresponds to ω ∼ ω′. Von Wright’s logic of preference
(1963) interprets preferences between two logical formulas
ϕ and ψ as “everything else being equal, I prefer an outcome
satisfying ϕ∧¬ψ to an outcome satisfying ψ∧¬ϕ”2.
The main issue is how “everything else being equal” (ce-
teris paribus) should be treated when interpreting ϕ is pre-
ferred to ψ. More precisely, such a preference statement
is generally interpreted as follows: ϕ is preferred to ψ is
true whenever for every outcomes ω and ω′ such that (i)
ω |= ϕ∧¬ψ, (ii) ω′ |= ψ∧¬ϕ and (iii) ω and ω′ are ce-
teris paribus with respect to ϕ∧¬ψ and ψ∧¬ϕ, then ω is
preferred to ω′. The notion of two outcomes being ceteris
paribus with respect to two formulas has yet to be defined.
Let F(α,β) be the set of pairs of outcomes that are ceteris
paribus with respect to α and β (such a function F is called
representation function in (Hansson 2001)). Several defini-
tions of increasing generality have been proposed:
• choosing F(α,β) = Mod(α)×Mod(β) leads to interpret-
ing ϕ is preferred to ψ as “every model of ϕ ∧ ¬ψ is
preferred to every model of ¬ϕ∧ψ” — see (von Wright
1963; Doyle, Shoham, and Wellman 1991).
• in (von Wright 1963), (ω,ω′) ∈ F(α,β) if ω and ω′ give
the same truth values to all propositional variables that are
mentioned neither in α nor in β.
• in (Doyle, Shoham, and Wellman 1991), and subse-
quently in (Tan and Pearl 1994), (ω,ω′) ∈ F(α,β) if ω
and ω′ give the same truth values to all propositional vari-
ables that are irrelevant to α and to β, where propositional
variable p is irrelevant to a formula ϕ if the truth value of
ϕ does not depend on the truth value of p.
• (Doyle and Wellman 1994) take a much more general ap-
proach and define F(α,β) via a contextual equivalence
2Interpreting “ϕ is preferred to ψ” as ϕ∧¬ψ is preferred to
¬ϕ ∧ ψ actually comes back to (Halldén 1957) and (Catañeda
1958). Note also that this principle fails whenever one of these
propositions is a logical consequence of the other (since it would
then consist in comparing a formula to a logical contradiction).
Some natural statements fall in this limit case: consider ϕ = I work
hard and earn a lot of money” and ψ = I work hard (Hansson 2001).
So as to take this limit case into account, Hansson (1989) proposes
a generalization of the latter principle, where a preference for ϕ
over ψ is interpreted as “everything else being equal, I prefer an
outcome satisfying ϕ/ψ to an outcome satisfying ψ/ϕ”, where α/β
is equal to α∧¬β when consistent, and to α otherwise.
relation which maps every set Σ of propositional formulas
to an equivalence relation ∼Σ on the set of outcomes (as
their approach is very general, they do not give a specific
way of defining∼Σ); and F(α,β) is simply taken to be the
equivalence relation ∼C assigned to the set C = {α,β}.
• (Hansson 2001) also proposes a very general approach,
based on arbitrary representation functions F , and fo-
cuses on representation functions based on a similarity
relation between pairs of outcomes: (ω,ω′) ∈ F(α,β)
if (ω,ω′) is a pair of maximally similar outcomes in
Mod(α)×Mod(β).
Then a major step is taken in (van Benthem, Girard, and
Roy 2009), who define, and axiomatize, a preference logic
LCP where preference is a genuine modality, and where
preference statements explicitly mention the set of formu-
las to be kept constant: if Γ is a set of formulas, then the
preference statement ϕ > ψ || Γ (the notation is ours) is true
whenever for every pair of outcomes ω and ω′ such that (i)
ω |= ϕ∧¬ψ, (ii) ω′ |= ψ∧¬ϕ and (iii) ω and ω′ coincide
on all formulas of Γ, then ω is preferred to ω′.3 Having the
set of fixed preferences specified in preference statements
allows one to recover many of the previous approaches, in-
cluding von Wright’s, as specific cases.
Other families of preference logics which are not directly
relevant to this paper include nonmonotonic logics of pref-
erence, where preference statements are interpreted all other
things being normal instead of all other things being equal,
e.g. (Boutilier 1994; Lang, van der Torre, and Weydert 2003;
Kaci and van der Torre 2008; Girard 2008)); logics for pref-
erence change, e.g. (van Benthem and Liu 2007; Liu 2008);
and logics for monadic preferences, e.g. (Hansson 2001).
Compact Preference Representation Languages
When the set of outcomes has a combinatorial structure, it is
unrealistic to expect the agent to rank them explicitly. Com-
pact preference languages are designed to exploit the struc-
tural properties (such as preferential independence or utility
independence) that preference relations or utility functions
often enjoy so as to elicit, store and process these prefer-
ences as compactly as possible. We don’t have enough space
for a survey of compact preference languages, so we just
name a few which we make reference to later in the paper.
The formalism CP-nets (Boutilier et al. 2004) is a graph-
ical language for preference representation based on the no-
tion of preferential independence. A CP-net over a set of
binary variables PS is a pair 〈G ,C 〉 where G is an oriented
graph whose vertices are PS, and C = {C(x)|x ∈ PS} is a set
of conditional preference tables: for every x, C(x) specifies
the preferences on the values of x given the values of its par-
ents in G . The edges of G express preferential independen-
cies: every x is preferentially independent of its non-parents
in G given its parents. TCP-nets (Brafman, Domshlak, and
Shimony 2006) enrich CP-nets by allowing the expression
of relative importance statements between variables. CP-
theories (Wilson 2004b) are still more general; they allow
3The logic defined in (van Benthem, Girard, and Roy 2009) is
actually considerably more general, as we discuss in Section 3.
conditional preference statements on the values of a vari-
able, together with a set of variables that are allowed to vary
when interpreting the preference statement. The language
considered in (Wilson 2009) is even more general: there
the preference statements do not compare single values of
variables but tuples of values of different variables. CI-nets
(Bouveret, Endriss, and Lang 2009) express monotonic pref-
erences between sets of goods, ceteris paribus.
Other compact representation languages are based on
propositional logic, such as prioritized goals (e.g., (Brewka
2004; Coste-Marquis et al. 2004; de Jongh and Liu 2009)).
All languages above are meant to express compactly or-
dinal preferences, that is, rankings on the set of outcomes.
Other languages are meant to express numerical preferences,
that is, utility functions (due to lack of space, and as our fo-
cus is on ordinal preferences, we omit references).
3. A Prototypical Preference Logic
We start by defining our “prototypical” preference logic,
named PL, which can be seen as a cross between von
Wright’s classic preference logic and the more recent and
more expressive logic LCP of van Benthem et al. (2009).
Let L be the propositional language built from a finite set
of propositional symbols PS, the usual connectives, and the
Boolean constants >, ⊥. Let χ, the integrity constraint, be
a consistent propositional formula in L. This can be used,
for example, to simulate multi-valued variables with propo-
sitional ones. χ will be fixed throughout the paper. We will
use the term possible outcome (abbreviated to outcome) to
refer to conjunctions of propositional literals which contain
each variable in PS exactly once, and which are consistent
with χ. Possible outcomes correspond to valuations of PS
which satisfy χ. Let Ω be the set of (possible) outcomes.
Definition 1 (language of PL).
• If α and β are formulas of L, and F is a set of formulas of
L then α B β ||F and α D β ||F are both formulas of PL.
• if Φ and Ψ are formulas of PL then ¬Φ, Φ∧Ψ, Φ∨Ψ are
formulas of PL.
Formulas of the form α B β ||F and α D β ||F are called
strict and non-strict preference statements respectively. An
arbitrary formula in PL is called a preference formula, which
is a boolean combination of some collection C of preference
statements; the elements of C are called the component pref-
erence statements of the preference formula. It is conve-
nient to define a notation for the constituent parts of a pref-
erence statement. If Φ is a preference statement ϕ B ψ ||S
then we define αΦ = ϕ, βΦ = ψ and FΦ = S, and similarly
if Φ = ϕ B ψ ||S. For instance, if Φ = a B ¬a ||{b,c}, then
αΦ = a, βΦ = ¬a, and FΦ = {b,c}. We refer to FΦ as the
set of fixed formulas (of Φ). If αΦ and βΦ are both out-
comes, then Φ is said to be a basic preference statement. If
FΦ is empty, we will sometimes abbreviate α B β || /0 (resp.
α D β || /0) to α B β (resp. α D β). We say that a prefer-
ence formula is free if FΦ = /0 for every component prefer-
ence statement Φ, it is conjunctive if it is a conjunction of
preference statements, and it is positive if it is built from
preference statements using only ∧ and ∨. The conjunctive
fragment of PL, consisting of only conjunctive preference
formulas, is denoted by PLC.
It is convenient to add the following notation, capturing
the usual ceteris paribus notion: αRβ ||CP (for R∈ {B,D})
is shorthand for αRβ ||Fα,β where Fα,β is the set of proposi-
tional symbols that do not appear in α nor in β.
Models and satisfaction in PL are defined as follows.
Definition 2 (models of PL). A model of PL is a complete
pre-order < on the set Ω of outcomes.
 and ∼ are the usual strict order and indifference rela-
tions induced from <. Given two outcomes ω,ω′ ∈ Ω and
a set F of formulas in L, we say that ω and ω′ agree on F ,
denoted by ω≈F ω′, if for every γ ∈ F we have ω |= γ if and
only if ω′ |= γ.
Definition 3 (satisfaction in PL).
• < |= α B β ||F if ω ω′ holds for all ω,ω′ ∈Ω such that
ω |= α, ω′ |= β, and ω≈F ω′
• < |= α D β ||F if ω < ω′ holds for all ω,ω′ ∈Ω such that
ω |= α, ω′ |= β, and ω≈F ω′
Boolean connectives are interpreted in the usual way.
A preference formula Γ is consistent if it has at least one
model, and inconsistent otherwise. A preference formula Γ
entails another preference formula ϒ, written Γ |= ϒ, if every
model of Γ is also a model of ϒ, which holds if and only if
the preference formula Γ∧¬ϒ is inconsistent. Equivalence
(≡) is defined in the usual way.
Discussion and Relation to Existing Preference
Logics
Our preference logic, like von Wright’s (1963), consists of
Boolean combinations of preference statements. However,
in place of von Wright’s preference statements αPβ, which
are interpreted as “α∧¬β-outcomes are preferred to ¬α∧β-
outcomes when the variables outside α and β are held con-
stant”, we use more general preference statements of the
form ϕ B ψ ||F which state that “ϕ-outcomes are preferred
to ψ-outcomes provided they agree on the interpretation of
formulas in F”. Thus, von Wright’s preference logic can
be straightforwardly encoded in our own simply by consid-
ering Boolean combinations of preference statements of the
form α∧¬β B β∧¬α ||CP. In a similar manner, the pref-
erence statements found in (Doyle, Shoham, and Wellman
1991) and (Tan and Pearl 1994) can be captured in our logic
by preference statements of the form α∧¬β B β∧¬α || I,
where I is the set of variables irrelevant to α and β.
Our decision to interpret α B β ||F as a comparison be-
tween α- and β-outcomes rather than α∧¬β- and β∧¬α-
outcomes was based on the fact that the latter semantics is
easily captured in our own framework, whereas a transla-
tion in the other direction is cumbersome at best. In prac-
tice, this means that preference statements have been prepro-
cessed – for instance, “I prefer an ice-cream (i) to a piece of
cake (c), everything else being equal” is directly expressed
as i∧¬c B ¬i∧ c ||CP.
Note that preconditions for preferences are easily ex-
pressed within our framework: “if γ then α is preferred
to β with F fixed” is expressed using the preference state-
ment γ∧α∧¬β B γ∧¬α∧β ||F . Also note that unlike von
Wright (and in accordance with van Benthem et al. 2009),
we choose to include both strict and non-strict preference
statements, since non-strict preference statements are re-
quired for the expression of indifference between sets of out-
comes. We also point out that our semantics is based on total
pre-orders, as are the semantics for most AI preference lan-
guages as well as von Wright’s preference logic. The logic
of van Benthem et al. employs partial pre-orders instead.
Finally, we remark that while our preference logic is in-
spired by LCP (van Benthem, Girard, and Roy 2009), and
incorporates some of its features (e.g. use of an explicit
fixed set of formulas), it is considerably less general. In-
deed, the modal logic of preferences LCP augments propo-
sitional logic with a set of unary (rather than binary) modal
operators of preference which are relativised by a fixed set
of formulas. Using these unary operators, different types
of binary preference statements with various semantics (in-
cluding our own) can be constructed. However, as we shall
see later in the paper, adopting the full expressivity of LCP
also means accepting an increase in the computational com-
plexity of reasoning.
In this paper we make a trade-off between complexity
and expressivity, and choose to work with our simple, yet
still fairly expressive, preference logic PL, which covers and
generalizes many AI preference languages as well as prefer-
ence logics (including von Wright’s), but also (we believe)
will be sufficiently expressive in most practical situations.
Investigating the computational properties of logics allow-
ing for preference statements with different semantics is left
for further research.
4. Preference Languages as Fragments of PL
We show that several well-known preference languages are
fragments of our prototypical preference logic PL.
CP-Nets
Let N = 〈G ,C 〉 be a propositional CP-net. We show that N
can be expressed as a conjunctive preference formula ΓN ,
built as follows. For every variable x, let U ⊆ PS \ {x} be
the parents of x in G . Then for every entry u : x  x̄ (resp.
u : x̄ x) in the conditional preference table C(x), we have a
conjunct γu∧ x B γu∧¬x ||CP (resp. γu∧¬x B γu∧ x ||CP),
where γu is the conjunction of literals corresponding to as-
signment u to variables U . For instance, let PS = {a,b}, let
G contain only a single edge from a to b, and let C(a) =
{a ā} and C(b) = {a : b b̄, ā : b̄ b}; then ΓN = (a B
¬a ||{b})∧ (a∧b B a∧¬b)∧ (¬a∧¬b B ¬a∧b).
It can be shown that for any two outcomes ω, ω′, N im-
plies ω  ω′ if and only if ΓN |= ω B ω′. Therefore CP-
nets are expressible within PL and correspond to a syntactic
restriction of its conjunctive fragment (made up of conjunc-
tions of preference statements bearing on conjunctions of lit-
erals satisfying some specific properties that we won’t state
here). Moreover, the CP-net fragment of PL can be encoded
in von Wright’s preference logic, since all component pref-
erence statements Γ are taken ceteris paribus and are such
that αΓ and βΓ are mutually inconsistent.
CP-nets and related formalisms are often based on a set
V of multi-valued variables, i.e., not just boolean variables.
Each variable x has an associated set of possible values
D(x). We can embed multi-valued variables into proposi-
tional logic in a standard way4: for each v∈D(x) we create a
propositional variable xv. Exhaustivity of D(x) is expressed
with the propositional formula
W
v∈D(x) x
v, and mutual ex-
clusivity with the formula
V
u,v∈D(x),u6=v(¬xu∨¬xv). We can
define the integrity constraint χ to be
V
x χ(x), where χ(x) is
the conjunction of the exhaustivity formula and the mutual
exclusivity formula for variable x. Complete assignments
to V are then in one-to-one correspondence with outcomes.
For instance, let x and y two variables, with D(x) =
{x1,x2,x3} and D(y) = {y, ȳ}. Consider the CP-net whose
dependency graph contains only an edge from X to Y , and
whose conditional preference tables are x1  x2  x3 and
x1 : y  ȳ, x2 : ȳ  y, x3 : y  ȳ. This CP-net is expressed
within PL by the propositional variables x1, x2, x3 and y, the
integrity constraint χ = (x1∨x2∨x3)∧ (¬x1∨¬x2)∧ (¬x1∨
¬x3)∧ (¬x2 ∨¬x3), and the preference formula Γ = (x1 B
x2 ||{y})∧ (x2 B x3 ||{y})∧ (x1∧ y B x1∧¬y)∧ (x2∧¬y B
x2∧ y)∧ (x3∧ y B x3∧¬y).
Extensions of CP-Nets
A language described in (Wilson 2009) involves preference
statements over a set V of multi-valued variables of the
form p > q ||T where p is an assignment to a set of vari-
ables P, q is an assignment to set of variables Q, and T
is a set of variables. Such a statement expresses a prefer-
ence for a complete assignment θ over a complete assign-
ment ρ whenever (i) θ extends p, (ii) ρ extends q, and (iii) θ
and ρ agree on variables T . The preference language from
(Wilson 2004b) involves statements of this form but where
P = Q, and p and q differ on exactly one variable. CP-nets
can be expressed with statements of this form with the addi-
tional condition that T =V \P. As shown in (Wilson 2004a),
TCP-nets can also be expressed with such statements where
|V \ (P∪T )|= 0 or 1.
Statement p > q ||T can be easily mapped into an equiv-
alent preference statement5 p′ B q′ ||T ′ in PL, where as-
signments p and q are mapped to conjunctions of literals in







T ′ = {xv : x ∈ T,v ∈ D(x)}.
Conditional Importance Networks
Conditional importance networks (CI-networks) are com-
pact representations of preference orderings over subsets of
set V of objects (goods). A CI-network is a set of conditional
importance statements (CI-statements). Each CI-statement
is of the form S+,S− : S1 B S2, and it expresses that for each
subset S ′ of T , S+ ∪ S1 ∪ S ′ is preferred to S+ ∪ S2 ∪ S ′,
4Obviously, shorter translations are possible, expressing each
multi-valued variable by a logarithmic number of binary variables.
5Or alternatively to p′ D q′ ||T ′ if instead one is using a non-
strict semantics.
where T = V \ (S+ ∪ S− ∪ S1 ∪ S2) is the set of other ob-
jects. For instance, a CI-statement {b}, /0 : {a} B {c,d}
expresses that the bundle of goods {a,b} ∪ X is preferred
to the bundle of goods {b,c,d} ∪ X , for any X such that
X ∩{a,b,c,d}= /0.
We now show how a CI-network corresponds to a con-
junctive preference formula. We map each object p to a
propositional variable which we also call p. A set S of ob-
jects then corresponds to an outcome whose positive literals
are the elements of S , and with negative literals for each
other propositional variable. In this way a preference order-
ing over sets of objects corresponds to a preference ordering
over outcomes.
The CI-statement S+,S− : S1  S2 can be mapped to the
preference statement γ∧δ∧γ1 B γ∧δ∧γ2 ||T in PL, where γ
(respectively, γ1, γ2) is the conjunction of positive literals in
S+ (respectively, S1, S2), and δ is the conjunction of negative
literals for propositional variables in S−.
The preference ordering on sets is assumed to respect
monotonicity, so that a set of goods is preferred to any proper
subset of it. This can be represented in our language by the
conjunction of preference statements p B ¬p ||V \{p} over
all p ∈V .
Prioritized Goals
A prioritized goal base is a sequence G = 〈G1, . . . ,Gn〉
where each Gi is a finite set of propositional formulas. For
ω ∈ Ω, let S(ω,Gi) = {ϕ ∈ Gi |ω |= ϕ}. Three well-known
semantics for inducing a preference relation from G (cf.
(Benferhat et al. 1993)) are:
• best-out: ω <boG ω′ if min{i |S(ω,Gi) 6= Gi} ≥
min{i |S(ω′,Gi) 6= Gi};
• discrimin: ω <discG ω′ if either (a) there is a k ≤ n such
that S(ω′,Gk) ( S(ω,Gk) and for every i < k, S(ω,Gi) =
S(ω′,Gi); or (b) S(ω,Gk) = S(ω′,Gk) for every k ≤ n.
• leximin: ω <lexG ω′ if either (a) there is a k ≤ n such that
|S(ω,Gk)| > |S(ω′,Gk)| and for every i < k, |S(ω,Gi)| =
|S(ω′,Gi)|; or (b) for every k≤ n, |S(ω,Gk)|= |S(ω′,Gk)|.
In the best-out case, let γi be the conjunction of all formulas
in Gi and δi = γ1∧·· ·∧ γi−1∧¬γi for 1≤ i≤ n, and δn+1 =
γ1∧·· ·∧ γn. Then we associate the following formula of PL





γ1∧·· ·∧ γi B δi || /0
)^(n+1̂
i=1
δi D δi || /0
)
Proposition 4. For any ω,ω′ ∈Ω, we have ωboG ω′ if and
only if ΦG,bo |= ω D ω′.
The discrimin and leximin cases are more interesting,
since the translation into PL makes use of fixed formulas.
For the sake of simplicity we first focus on prioritized goal
bases where each Gi is a singleton {γi}. In this case, <discG
and <lexG coincide and ω <
disc
G ω
′ if either (a) there is a k≤ n
such that ω |= γk, ω′ |=¬γk and for every i < k, ω |= γi if and
only if ω′ |= γi or (b) for every i ≤ n, ω |= γi if and only if
ω′ |= γi. In this case, the formula of PL associated with G is:
n̂
i=1
(γi B ¬γi ||{γ1, . . . ,γi−1})
^
(>D>||{γ1, . . . ,γn})
For instance, the goal base G = 〈{a},{b∨ c},{b∧ c}〉 is
mapped to (a B ¬a || /0)∧ (b∨c B ¬(b∨c) ||{a})∧ (b∧c B
¬(b∧ c) ||{a,b∨ c})∧ (>D>||{a,b∨ c,b∧ c}) in PL.
In the general case where the Gi’s are not necessarily sin-
gletons, a translation to PL is possible for discrimin and lex-
imin, but leads to an exponential blow-up.
In the discrimin case, we can use the following formula to



















¬ψ || ∪i−1k=1 Gk)
∧ (>D>|| ∪ni=1 Gi)
Proposition 5. For any ω,ω′ ∈Ω, we have ωdiscG ω′ if and
only if ΦG,disc |= ω D ω′.
For the leximin case, we will make use of the following
abbreviation








which expresses that at least k formulas in S hold true. The







(≥ j : Gi B ¬(≥ j : Gi) ||Fi−1)
∧ (>D>||Fn)
where Fi = {≥ ` : Gk |1≤ k ≤ i,1≤ `≤ |Gk|}.
Proposition 6. For any ω,ω′ ∈Ω, we have ωlexG ω′ if and
only if ΦG,lex |= ω D ω′.
For instance, let G = 〈G1,G2〉 with G1 = {p∨ q,r} and
G2 = {¬p,¬q}. We have
ΦG,disc = ((p∨q)∧ r B (¬p∧¬q)∨¬r || /0)
∧ ((p∨q)∧¬r B ¬p∧¬q∧¬r || /0)
∧ (r∧¬p∧¬q B ¬r∧¬p∧¬q || /0)
∧ (¬p∧¬q B p∨q ||{p∨q,r})
∧ (¬p∧q B p∧q ||{p∨q,r})
∧ (p∧¬q B p∧q ||{p∨q,r})
∧ (>D>||{p∨q,r,¬p,¬q})
and
ΦG,lex = ((p∨q)∧ r B (¬p∧¬q)∨¬r || /0)
∧ (p∨q∨ r B ¬p∧¬q∧¬r || /0)
∧ (¬p∧¬q B p∨q ||{(p∨q)∧ r, p∨q∨ r})
∧ (¬p∨¬q B p∧q ||{(p∨q)∧ r, p∨q∨ r})
∧ (>D>||{(p∨q)∧ r, p∨q∨ r,
¬p∧¬q,¬p∨¬q})
Two remarks are in order. First, for both discrimin and lex-
imin semantics, the exponential blow-up is with respect to
the cardinality of the largest priority class Gi, rather than
the entire goal base. Thus, if each priority class contains
only a few formulae, the translation to PL will not be too
onerous. Second, we remark that in the case of leximin, a
polynomial translation into PL is possible provided we in-
troduce new propositional variables to define the cardinal-
ity formulas ≥ k : S, cf. (Benhamou, Sais, and Siegel 1994;
Liu and Truszczynski 2003).
Discussion
Not only have we shown that some well-known preference
languages happen to be fragments of PL, but we can define
other useful fragments that do not correspond to any exist-
ing languages so far. In particular, it seems natural to com-
bine different preference languages, which could be cap-
tured in our framework but not in the individual preference
languages. We can think, for example, of expressing pref-
erences on a complex domain where preference statements
in some parts of the domain are of the CP-net kind, whereas
some other parts make use of prioritized goals. Apart from
the approach in (Brewka, Niemelä, and Truszczynski 2005),
we are not aware of such combinations of languages.
Example 7. Consider an agent who is considering buying
some items on the internet. The items she can possibly pur-
chase are the outgoing flight (o), the return flight (r), a hotel
night (h), and a book (b). Her preferences about the flight
tickets are best modelled in a prioritized goal fashion: better
both tickets than none, and better none than just one; tickets
being much more expensive than the rest, these preferences
override everything else. Now, if she buys the flight tickets,
then she wants a hotel night, otherwise she doesn’t. Lastly,
she want to buy the book in any case, whether she goes on a
trip or not. Her preferences can be expressed by the follow-
ing preference formula
Φ = o∧ r B ¬o∧¬r || /0
∧ ¬o∧¬r B o↔¬r || /0
∧ o∧ r∧h B o∧ r∧¬h || /0
∧ ¬(o∧ r)∧¬h B ¬(o∧ r)∧h ||{o,r}
∧ b B ¬b ||CP
Disjunctions of preference statements are needed for ex-
pressing structural properties of the agent’s preference re-
lation, such as preferential independence or relative impor-
tance. For instance, let PS = {a,b,c}; we can express that b
is preferentially independent of c given a by the preference
formula ((a∧ b D a∧¬b ||{c})∨ (a∧¬b D a∧ b ||{c}))∧
((¬a ∧ b D ¬a ∧ ¬b ||{c}) ∨ (¬a ∧ ¬b D ¬a ∧ b ||{c})).
(Given either a or ¬a, whether or not b is preferred to ¬b
does not depend on the value of c.) We can express that
the propositional variable a is more important than the other
propositional variables b and c (in the lexicographic sense)
by the preference formula (a D ¬a || /0)∨ (¬a D a || /0), im-
plying that if a is preferred to ¬a then any outcome satisfy-
ing a is preferred to any outcome satisfying ¬a; similarly, if
¬a is preferred to a.
Negation and disjunction also allow implications between
preference statements (Φ→ Ψ being a shorthand for ¬Φ∨
Ψ). Implication is useful for expressing domain restric-
tions, such as single-peakedness (a key notion in social
choice). For instance, when reasoning about the preferences
of an agent about curries, (mild B hot ||CP)→ (hot B very-
hot ||CP) (where χ implies that mild, hot and very-hot are
mutually exclusive) expresses that if the agent prefers a mild
curry to a hot curry ceteris paribus, then she prefers a hot
curry to a very hot curry, ceteris paribus.
Free preference statements allow clear and strong state-
ments to be made about an agent’s preferences. To continue
with our curry example, an agent who has a low tolerance
for spice might express with the free preference statement
mild B very-hot that any meal containing a mild curry is
preferred to any meal with very hot curry. Free preferences
are obviously related to the ∀∀ interpretation of preferences
between formulas (see e.g., (Kaci and van der Torre 2008;
van Benthem, Girard, and Roy 2009).
5. The Conjunctive Fragment of PL
We have seen in Section 4 that many AI preference lan-
guages can be encoded in the conjunctive fragment PLC
of PL. The aim of the current section is to provide a char-
acterization of consistency and dominance for conjunctive
preference formulas, which can be seen as a generalization
of “flipping sequences” for CP-nets (Boutilier et al. 2004).
We start by introducing some notation. If Φ is a prefer-
ence statement α R β ||F , where R is either B or D, then
Φ∗ is defined to consist of all pairs of outcomes (ω,ω′) such
that ω |= α, ω′ |= β, and ω and ω′ agree on F . It follows
from the semantics that the model < satisfies a strict pref-
erence statement Φ if and only if  contains Φ∗, and that
< satisfies a non-strict preference statement Φ if and only if
< contains Φ∗. For a conjunctive preference formula Γ, we
define Γ∗ to be the union of Φ∗ over all conjuncts Φ of Γ.
The transitive relation >Γ on the set of outcomes is de-
fined as follows: for outcomes ω and ω′, we have ω >Γ ω′
if and only if there exists a sequence ω1, . . . ,ωk of outcomes
with ω1 = ω and ωk = ω′ and a sequence Φ1, . . . ,Φk−1 of
conjuncts of Γ such that for some i, Φi is a strict preference
statement, and for all i = 1, . . . ,k−1, (ωi, ωi+1) ∈ (Φi)∗.
The relation ≥Γ is defined in just the same way, except
without the condition that some Φ is strict, so that ≥Γ is
the transitive closure of Γ∗. Clearly, ≥Γ extends >Γ. We
also have that if ω >Γ ω′ ≥Γ ω′′ then ω >Γ ω′′, and if ω≥Γ
ω′ >Γ ω
′′ then ω >Γ ω′′.
The following lemma, which is used in the proof of
Proposition 9 below, shows that satisfaction for conjunctive
preference formulas can be expressed in terms of the rela-
tions ≥Γ and >Γ.
Lemma 8. A model < satisfies a conjunctive preference for-
mula Γ if and only if < contains ≥Γ and  contains >Γ.
The following result characterizes consistency and domi-
nance for a conjunctive preference formula Γ. It shows that
the relations ≥Γ and >Γ represent what is entailed by a con-
junctive preference formula Γ.
Proposition 9. Let Γ be a conjunctive preference formula.
1. Γ is inconsistent if and only if >Γ contains (ω,ω) for some
outcome ω.
2. If Γ is consistent and ω, ω′ are outcomes, then
(a) Γ entails ω B ω′ if and only if >Γ contains (ω,ω′);
(b) Γ entails ω D ω′ if and only if ≥Γ contains (ω,ω′).
3. Let Γ,Φ be consistent preference formulas. Then, Γ ≡ Φ
if and only if ≥Γ = ≥Φ and >Γ = >Φ.
Proposition 9 shows for instance that proving ω D ω′
comes down to exhibiting a sequence of outcomes from ω
to ω′ such that each outcome is at least as preferred as its
successor according to one of the preference statements.
Example 10. Let PS = {a,b} and Γ = (a D ¬a ||{b})∧
(a ∧ b B a ∧ ¬b) ∧ (¬a ∧ ¬b D ¬a ∧ b). ≥Γ is the com-
plete pre-order ab < ab̄ < āb̄ < āb, whereas >Γ is the strict
partial order {ab  ab̄, ab  āb̄, ab  āb}. From this we
can draw the following inferences: Γ |= a ∧ b B ¬a ∧ b,
Γ |= ¬a∧¬b D ¬a∧b, Γ |= a ∧ ¬b D ¬a ∧ ¬b; but Γ 6|=
¬a∧¬b B ¬a∧b, and Γ 6|= a∧¬b B ¬a∧¬b.
6. Computational Complexity
In this section, we study the complexity of two fundamental
reasoning tasks for preferences, consistency and dominance.
The latter is the problem of deciding whether a preference
formula entails ω B ω′ for a pair of outcomes ω,ω′.
Reduction to Conjunctive Formulas
We begin by showing how reasoning with general or positive
preference formulas in PL can be transformed into reasoning
about conjunctive preference formulas.
We first remark that we can assume without loss of gener-
ality that preference formulas are built from preference state-
ments and negations of preference statements using only
conjunction and disjunction. This is because arbitrary pref-
erence statements can be put in this form simply by applying
the standard (linear-time) negation normal form transforma-
tion from propositional logic, treating preference statements
as propositional atoms. We assume henceforth that all pref-
erence formulas are in this form.
Next, we note that by distributing disjunction over con-
junction, we can transform any preference formula into an
equivalent disjunction of conjunctions of preference state-
ments and negations of preference statements. We will use
DNF(Γ) to refer to the result of applying this procedure to a
preference formula Γ. Recall from propositional logic that
this transformation may yield an exponential number of dis-
juncts, but that each disjunct has only polynomial size as it
is a conjunction of preference statements (or their negations)
appearing in the original formula.
Finally we remark that negations of preference statements
can be replaced by equivalent disjunctions of (positive) pref-
erence statements. Indeed, it follows from the semantics that
¬(ω B ω′)≡ ω′ D ω and ¬(ω D ω′)≡ ω′ B ω. This means










Putting this all together, we get:
Proposition 11. Let Γ be a preference formula, and let DΓ
be the set of disjuncts of DNF(Γ). Create a new set SΓ com-
posed of all formulas obtained from a formula in DΓ by re-
placing each component strict negative preference statement
¬Φ by a formula ω′ D ω such that (ω,ω′) ∈ Φ∗, and each
non-strict negative preference statement ¬Φ by a formula
ω′ B ω such that (ω,ω′) ∈Φ∗. Note that each formula in SΓ
is a conjunctive preference formula.
1. Let ϒ be some preference formula. Then, Γ |= ϒ if and
only if for all Ψ ∈ SΓ, Ψ |= ϒ.
2. Γ is consistent if and only if some Ψ ∈ SΓ is consistent.
Complexity of PL
Using the embedding of CP-nets into PL shown earlier, we
can obtain a PSPACE lower bound for reasoning in PL, using
results in (Goldsmith et al. 2008). For the conjunctive frag-
ment of PL, thanks to our characterization of consistency
and dominance (Proposition 9), we can show membership in
PSPACE by adopting a similar strategy to that used for gen-
eral CP-nets. We can then extend the PSPACE membership
result to arbitrary preference formulas in PL by leveraging
the fact that arbitrary preference formulas can be rewritten
as disjunctions of conjunctive preference formulas (Proposi-
tion 11). This leads to the following result:
Proposition 12. Consistency and dominance in PL are
PSPACE-complete. Hardness holds even for PLC.
Since we can encode (binary) CP-nets in the logic of von
Wright, and we can encode von Wright’s logic in our own,
we obtain the following corollary. Note that von Wright’s
own decision procedures require exponential space.
Corollary 13. Consistency and dominance in von Wright’s
logic of preference are PSPACE-complete.
In a similar manner, we obtain PSPACE-completeness for
the logics of (Doyle, Shoham, and Wellman 1991) and (Tan
and Pearl 1994).
One might wonder whether it is possible to extend Propo-
sition 12 even further to the full modal preference logic LCP
of van Benthem et al. We show that this is not the case,
as consistency becomes NEXPTIME-hard (and it is gener-
ally believed that PSPACE6=NEXPTIME). The culprit is their
conditionalized universal modality [Γ], which allows one to
specify properties that hold at all worlds which give the same
values to the formulas in Γ as a given world. This enables
an elegant reduction from the NEXPTIME-complete 2n×2n
tiling problem to consistency in LCP .
Proposition 14. Consistency in LCP is NEXPTIME-hard.
Proof sketch. We recall that an instance of the 2n × 2n
bounding tiling problem is given by a triple (T,H,V ) with
T a non-empty, finite set of tile types including an initial tile
t1 to be placed on the lower left corner, H ⊆ T×T a hori-
zontal matching relation, and V ⊆T×T a vertical matching
relation. A tiling for (T,H,V ) is a map f : {0, . . . ,2n−1}×
{0, . . . ,2n − 1} → T such that f (0,0) = T1, ( f (i, j), f (i +
1, j)) ∈ H for all i < 2n−1, and ( f (i, j), f (i, j +1)) ∈V for
all j < 2n−1. It is NEXPTIME-complete to decide whether
a tiling problem admits a tiling.
Given a tiling problem (T,H,V ), we construct a formula
Φ ∈ LCP such that Φ is consistent if and only if there is
there exists a tiling for (T,H,V ). The formula Φ will uti-
lize the variables x1, . . . ,xn,y1, . . .yn, t1, . . . , tk (where T =
{t1, . . . , tk}). The xi and yi will encode the binary representa-
tion of horizontal and vertical coordinates, and the ti repre-
sent the tile types. Our encoding will utilise LCP -formulas
of the form [Γ]ϕ. Such a formula is verified at a world w if
ϕ is satisfied by every world v with w ∼Γ v. The modality
〈Γ〉 is the dual modality to [Γ], so 〈Γ〉ϕ holds at w if there is
some v with w∼Γ v that verifies ϕ. The modality 2 is an ab-
breviation for [ /0] and corresponds to the standard universal
modality. We define Φ as the conjunction of the following
formulas, which we annotate with their purpose:
• Exactly one tile per world.





• Worlds with the same coordinates have the same tile.Vk
i=1 2(ti→ [x1, . . . ,xn,y1, . . . ,yn]ti)
• Specification of the lower left corner.
¬x1∧·· ·∧¬xn∧¬y1∧·· ·∧¬yn∧ t1
• Horizontal grid successors exist.Vn
m=1 2((x1∧·· ·∧ xm−1∧¬xm)→
〈xm+1, . . . ,xn,y1, . . . ,yn〉(¬x1∧·· ·∧¬xm−1∧xm))
• Vertical grid successors exist.Vn
m=1 2((y1∧·· ·∧ ym−1∧¬ym)→
〈ym+1, . . . ,yn,x1, . . . ,xn〉(¬y1∧·· ·∧¬ym−1∧ym))
• Horizontal matching relation is satisfied.Vk
i=1
Vn
m=1 2((x1∧·· ·∧ xm−1∧¬xm∧ ti)→
[xm+1, . . . ,xn,y1, . . . ,yn]
((¬x1∧·· ·∧¬xm−1∧xm)→
W
t j :(ti,t j)∈H t j))
• Vertical matching relation is satisfied.Vk
i=1
Vn
m=1 2((y1∧·· ·∧ ym−1∧¬ym∧ ti)→
[ym+1, . . . ,yn,x1, . . . ,xn]
((¬y1∧·· ·∧¬ym−1∧ym)→
W
t j :(ti,t j)∈V t j))
For a proof that the formula Φ has the desired properties,
refer to the long version of the paper.
Complexity of Free Preferences
We know from CP-nets that reasoning is PSPACE-hard for
the conjunctive fragment even under the restriction that com-
ponent preference statements Φ are such that FΦ contains
only variables and αΦ and βΦ are cubes, i.e., conjunctions
of literals. Thus, in order to isolate fragments of PL with
lower complexity, we consider the case when F is empty.
Our first result provides a characterization of consistency
and dominance for conjunctions of free preference state-
ments. It makes reference to the graph GΓ associated with
a conjunctive preference formula Γ which is defined as fol-
lows: the vertices of GΓ are the component preference state-
ments of Γ, and there is an edge from Φ to Ψ whenever
βΦ∧αΨ is compatible with the integrity constraint χ.
Lemma 15. Let Γ be a conjunction of a set S of free prefer-
ence statements, and let θ and ρ be outcomes. Then
1. >Γ contains (θ,ρ) if and only if there exists Φ,Ψ∈ S with
θ |= αΦ, and ρ |= βΨ, and there exists a directed path from
Φ to Ψ in GΓ which includes at least one strict preference
statement.
2. ≥Γ contains (θ,ρ) if and only if there exists Φ,Ψ∈ S with
θ |= αΦ, and ρ |= βΨ, and there exists a directed path from
Φ to Ψ in GΓ.
Using Lemma 15 and Proposition 9, we obtain the follow-
ing characterization of consistency and dominance:
Proposition 16. Suppose that Γ is a conjunction of a set S
of free preference statements. Then the following hold:
1. Γ is inconsistent if and only if GΓ contains a cycle involv-
ing at least one strict preference statement.
2. Let ω and ω′ be outcomes. If Γ is consistent, then
(a) Γ entails ω B ω′ if and only if there exists Φ,Ψ ∈ S
with ω |= αΦ, and ω′ |= βΨ, and there exists a directed
path from Φ to Ψ in GΓ involving at least one strict
preference statement.
(b) Γ entails ω D ω′ if and only if there exists Φ,Ψ∈ S with
ω |= αΦ, and ω′ |= βΨ, and there exists a directed path
from Φ to Ψ in GΓ.
Example 17. Let χ => and Γ = Φ1∧Φ2∧Φ3 where Φ1 =
(a∧¬c D b || /0), Φ2 = (¬a∧b B ¬a∧¬b || /0), Φ3 = (¬b D
a∧ b∧ c || /0). The graph GΓ contains precisely the edges
(Φ1,Φ1), (Φ1,Φ2) and (Φ2,Φ3). Hence, by Proposition 16,
Γ is consistent. We also obtain that Γ entails abc̄ B abc,
because abc̄ |= αΦ1 , abc |= βΦ3 , there is a path from Φ1
to Φ3 in GΓ, and at least one of the preference statements
involved in the path is strict (i.e., Φ2).
Proposition 16 implies that determining consistency of
a conjunction Γ of free preference statements – as well as
checking dominance for pairs of outcomes w.r.t. Γ – is poly-
nomial whenever checking the compatibility of βΦ∧αΨ with
the integrity constraint χ is polynomial. This holds, in par-
ticular, if χ => and all the α’s and β’s are cubes.
Proposition 18. When χ = >, dominance and consistency
are both tractable for conjunctions of preference statements
of the form α B β where α,β are both cubes.
In the more general case in which the preference state-
ments may contain arbitrary formulas the complexity jumps
to co-NP for consistency (and NP for dominance).
Proposition 19. Consistency (resp. dominance) is co-NP-
complete (resp. NP-complete) for conjunctions of free pref-
erence statements.
Proof. We consider only consistency, but dominance is han-
dled similarly. Co-NP-hardness is straightforward: a propo-
sitional CNF ϕ is unsatisfiable if and only if the preference
statement ϕ B ϕ || /0 is consistent. For membership in co-
NP, we have, by Proposition 16, that the formula Γ is in-
consistent if and only if GΓ is cyclic. To show cyclicity
of GΓ, we guess a sequence of (distinct) preference state-
ments Ψ1, . . . ,Ψm from Γ, together with a sequence of val-
uations v1, . . . ,vm. We then verify in polynomial time that
vm |= βΨm ∧ αΨ1 and for each 1 ≤ i ≤ m− 1, we have
vi |= βΨi ∧αΨi+1 . If this is the case, there must be edges be-
tween Ψi and Ψi+1 (1≤ i≤m−1) and between Ψm and Ψ1,
so GΓ contains a cycle. Moreover, if GΓ is cyclic, we can
clearly guess a sequence of preference statements and val-
uations satisfying the desired conditions. This yields mem-
bership in NP for cyclicity of GΓ, and hence a co-NP upper
bound for consistency of Γ.
For boolean combinations of free preference statements
where the αΦ,βΦ are cubes, the complexities of the two
problems are swapped: it is consistency which is NP-
complete, and dominance which is co-NP-complete.
Proposition 20. Suppose χ = >. Consistency (resp. dom-
inance) is NP-complete (resp. co-NP-complete) for prefer-
ence formulas built from free preference statements Φ such
that αΦ and βΦ are conjunctions of literals.
Proof. We consider only consistency; dominance is treated
similarly. For membership in NP, we know from Lemma
11 that Γ is consistent if and only if some Ψ ∈ SΓ is consis-
tent. The idea then is to guess some Ψ ∈ SΓ and to verify its
consistency. It follows from the definition of SΓ that Ψ is a
(polysize) conjunction of free preference statements Φ such
that αΦ and βΦ are conjunctions of literals. It follows then
from Proposition 18 that consistency of Ψ can be decided in
polytime.
For hardness, consider an instance of SAT on variables
x1, . . . ,xn, represented as a conjunction of disjunction of lit-
erals. For j = 1 . . . ,2n, let θ j be different outcomes. Let
Pj be the preference statement θ2 j−1 B θ2 j, and let N j be the
preference statement θ2 j B θ2 j−1. Generate a preference for-
mula Γ by replacing each positive literal x j by Pj, and each
negative literal ¬x j by N j. It can be seen that Γ is consistent
if and only if the SAT instance is satisfiable.
For the case where arbitrary formulas may appear in the
preference statements, we give only upper bounds.
Proposition 21. Consistency is in Σp2 for free preference for-
mulas, whereas dominance belongs to Πp2 .
Proof Sketch. We combine the ideas from Propositions 19
and 20. To decide consistency of a free preference for-
mula Γ, we first guess some Ψ ∈ SΓ, and then we use an
NP-oracle to verify the consistency of Ψ.




Note that Propositions 18, 19, 20, and 21 can be used
to derive corresponding results for the bounded fragment
of PL in which |F | is bounded by some constant k. To
do so, we simply translate a formula ϕ B ψ ||{χ1 . . . ,χk}
into the conjunction of all of the free preference statements
µ∧ϕ B µ∧ψ such that µ = λ1∧ ·· ·λk where λi ∈ {χi,¬χi}
for every 1≤ i≤ k.
Overall, the above results show that the complexity of rea-
soning with arbitrary free preference formulas is much lower
than for conjunctions of even very simple preference state-
ments without restrictions on the number of fixed formulas.
7. Expressiveness and Succinctness
Given two languages L1 and L2, we recall from (Cadoli et
al. 2000) that L1 is at least as succinct as L2 if there exists
a polysize, equivalence-preserving translation f from L2 to
L1, i.e., (i) for any Φ∈ L2, f (Φ)∈ L1 is equivalent to Φ, and
(ii) there exists a polynomial p s.t. for any Φ ∈ L2, | f (Φ)| ≤
p(|Φ|). Moreover, L1 is at least as expressive as L2 if there
exists an equivalence-preserving translation f from L2 to L1.
We have shown earlier that the positive fragment of PL
is just as expressive as the whole language. However, ex-
cluding negation incurs a potential exponential blowup in
formula size, as the following result attests.
Proposition 22. Given χ = >, the positive fragment of PL
is strictly less succinct than PL.
Proof Sketch. Let Φ be the preference formula ¬Γ, where
Γ is a preference statement x1 D ¬x1 || /0 and x1 is a propo-
sitional variable. Φ is equivalent to a disjunction Φ′ of the
exponentially many basic preference statements of the form
θ B τ for all θ extending ¬x1 and all τ extending x1. It can
be shown (with a bit of work) that there is no more compact
representation of Φ as a positive preference formula.
Moving from preference statements to conjunctive prefer-
ence formulas, and also on to positive preference formulas,
increases the expressivity of the language:
Proposition 23. The conjunctive fragment of PL is strictly
less expressive than the positive fragment of PL.
Proof Sketch. Consider the positive preference formula Ψ =
(θ1 B θ2)∨(θ2 B θ3), where θ1, θ2 and θ3 are three different
outcomes. It can be shown that Ψ does not entail any non-
tautologous conjunctive preference formula, hence there can
be no conjunctive preference formula equivalent to Ψ.
Proposition 24. The preference statement fragment of PL is
strictly less expressive than the conjunctive fragment of PL.
Proof Sketch. Let Ψ be the conjunctive preference statement
(θ1 B θ2)∧ (θ2 B θ3), where θ1, θ2 and θ3 are different
outcomes. It can be shown that no consistent preference
statement implies Ψ, which means there exists no preference
statement equivalent to Ψ, as required.
We now consider sublanguages of the conjunctive frag-
ment PLC. For the sake of simplicity, we consider only strict
preference statements (results can easily be extended to the
general case but are a little bit tedious to state). Let PLsC be
the resulting language.
A first way of obtaining interesting fragments of PLsC con-
sists in imposing syntactic restrictions on αΦ and βΦ. Given
a subset T of L, the fragment PLsC,T is the set of all conjunc-
tions of preference statements of the form α B β ||F , where
α ∈ T and β ∈ T (we do not restrict F). Let Lit, Cl, and Cb
be respectively the sets of literals, clauses, and cubes built
from PS.
For every consistent Φ and Ψ in PLsC, using Proposi-
tion 9, we have that Φ and Ψ are equivalent if and only if
>Φ = >Ψ. For a sublanguage L of PLsC, let Exp(L) = {>Φ
|Φ is consistent and Φ ∈ L}. We have that, given two sub-
languages L1 and L2 of PLsC, L1 and L2 are equally expres-
sive if Exp(L1) = Exp(L2) and L1 is strictly less expressive
than L2 if Exp(L1) ( Exp(L2).
Proposition 25 (expressiveness inside PLsC).
• PLsC,Cb is equally as expressive as PLsC.
• If χ = >, then PLsC,Cb is strictly more expressive than
PLsC,Lit .
• PLsC,Cl is equally as expressive as PLsC,Lit .
Proof of Point 2. We aim to show that Exp(PLsC,Lit) (
Exp(PLsC,Cb). Let PS = {a,b}, and consider the following
free preference statement from PLsC,Cb:
Φ = a∧b B ¬a∧¬b
Now suppose there exists a formula Ψ in PLsC,Lit which
is equivalent to Ψ. Then by Proposition 9, we have that
>Ψ=>Φ. As ab >Φ āb̄, we must also have ab >Ψ āb̄.
By Proposition 9, there must exist a sequence of outcomes
ω1, . . . ,ωn such that ω1 = ab, ωn = āb̄, and for every i < n,
(ωi,ωi+1) is sanctioned by a preference statement in Ψ.
Note however that if n > 2, then we have ω1 >Ψ ωn−1 >Ψ
ωn, which cannot be since >Φ (hence >Ψ) contains a single
tuple, namely (ab, āb̄). Thus, it must be the case that n = 2,
and there is a single preference statement `1 B `2 ||F from
PLsC,Lit which sanctions ab >Ψ āb̄. It follows that the literal
`1 is either a or b, and `2 is either ¬a or ¬b; we consider
only the case where `1 = a and `2 = ¬a, but the other three
cases proceed similarly. Now we also know that ab ≈F āb̄.
But any formula on PS which is interpreted identically by
ab and āb̄ must be equivalent to >, ⊥, or a↔ b. It fol-
lows that F only contains formulae of these three types. But
that means that the preference statement sanctions ab̄ >Ψ āb
since ab̄ |= `1, āb |= `2, and ab̄ and āb agree on the interpre-
tation of >, ⊥, and a↔ b. This contradicts our assumption
that >Ψ=>Φ.
Writing L <e L′ for L strictly less expressive than L′ and
L ∼e L′ for L equally as expressive as L′, Proposition 25
yields:
PLsC,Lit ∼e PLsC,Cl <e PLsC,Cb ∼e PLsC
The reason why we need the condition χ => in some of
the results above is that otherwise it is possible to restrict
the set of possible outcomes in a drastic way, so that both
languages are equally expressive or equally succinct (for in-
stance, in the extreme case where χ has a unique model, then
all fragments of PLC are equally expressive).
We now show that using clauses rather than literals does
not result in a more succinct language. We conjecture that
PLsC,Cb is strictly less succinct than PL
s
C, but so far we don’t
have a proof.
Proposition 26. PLsC,Cl and PL
s
C,Lit are equally succinct.
A second way of obtaining fragments of PLC consists in
restricting the allowed sets of fixed formulas FΦ. We con-
sider three options: restrictions to propositional symbols
(PLsC,FPS), to free preference statements (PL
s
C,FREE ), and to
ceteris paribus preference statements (PLsC,CP). Note that
PLsC,FREE ,PL
s
C,CP ( PLsC,FPS ( PLsC.
We first note that the encoding of a preference relation
in PLsC,Cb (by explicitly comparing maximal cubes) belongs
both to PLsC,FREE and to PL
s
C,CP, which shows that these
fragments are fully expressive.
Regarding succinctness, we have the following:
Proposition 27.
• PLsC,FREE is strictly less succinct than PLsFPS;
• PLsC,FPS is strictly less succinct than PLsC.
Proof of Point 1. Let Φ = (x1 B ¬x1 ||{x2, . . . ,xn}). We
have that ω >Φ ω′ if and only if ω = x1∧ γ and ω′ = ¬x1∧ γ
for some maximal consistent cube γ built on {x2, . . . ,xn}.
Let Ψ ∈ PLsC,FREE such that >Ψ=>Φ. From Proposition
16, ω >Ψ ω′ if and only if there exists a sequence of pref-
erence statements ϕ1 B ψ1,ϕ2 B ψ2, . . . ,ϕq B ψq in Ψ such
that for every i < q, ψi ∧ ϕi+1 is satisfiable, and ω |= ϕ1,
ω′ |= ψq. Suppose q≥ 2; then ψ1∧ϕ2 is satisfiable, and for
every ω′′ |= ψ1 ∧ϕ2 we have ω >Ψ ω′′ >Ψ ω′. This con-
tradicts >Ψ=>Φ, because there is no triple (ω,ω′,ω′′) in
Φ such that ω >Φ ω′′ >Φ ω′. Therefore, q = 1, and this
is true for every maximal consistent γ built on {x2, . . . ,xn}.
Thus for every such γ there must exist a preference statement
(ϕγ B ψγ || /0) in Ψ such that x1 ∧ γ |= ϕγ and ¬x1 ∧ γ |= ψγ.
Now, assume that (ϕγ,ψγ) = (ϕγ′ ,ψγ′) holds for some γ and
γ′ 6= γ. Then we have x1∧γ |= ϕγ and¬x1∧γ′ |= ψγ, therefore
x1 ∧ γ >Ψ ¬x1 ∧ γ′, which contradicts >Ψ=>Φ. Therefore,
we have a distinct preference statement ϕγ B ψγ || /0 in Ψ for
every γ, which implies that Ψ contains at least 2n−1 prefer-
ence statements.
8. Conclusion
The contributions of this paper are twofold. First, from an
AI point of view, we provide a more expressive language
for preference representation, whose worst-case complex-
ity is not worse than the worst-case complexity of CP-nets.
The results we obtained concerning the different fragments
of our logic go some way to generating a map for choosing
the right trade-off between expressiveness, complexity, and
succinctness. Second, the computational aspects of prefer-
ence logics had almost never been dealt with before, and our
work include significant results for some important prefer-
ence logics. This paper contributes to bringing together two
research areas which have so far had little interaction.
Further work includes a similar study for other fragments
of the logic of van Benthem et al., in particular when the
interpretation of preference statements uses a different alter-
nation of quantifiers than ∀∀. Also, we intend to explore the
connections between our results and complexity, expressive-
ness and succinctness results for logics for cardinal prefer-
ence representation (e.g., (Uckelman et al. 2009)). Finally,
an interesting topic for further research would consist in us-
ing our preference logic — and preference logics in general
— on dynamic environments including actions, where pref-
erences over states could be lifted to preferences over actions
or courses of actions.
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